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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Unprecedented political violence spread in Kenya following the disputed December
2007 General Election. The mediation by the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent
African Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan saw the two main
parties – the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement
(ODM) – agree to undertake several actions to stop the violence and end the crisis.
2. This is the fifth progress review report on the implementation of the actions developed
under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) mediation agreements.
Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org. This report covers the period
between October and December 2009.
3. This report is based on data collected using interviews with key informants, and focus
group discussions. A survey in the regions affected by the post-election violence,
comprising a sample from Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), was also undertaken
(Annex 1 contains the main findings – Situational Analysis of PEV areas, December
2009). Additional information was collected through content analysis of secondary
sources.
Findings
Insecurity
4. Findings during the period between October and December 2009 once again point to
security as an issue of concern in several parts of the country. The government has not
effectively demobilised the various illegally armed groups. Some of these groups have
transformed into criminal extortion gangs. They control enormous amounts of money
through extortion rackets in several sectors of the economy, especially in poor urban
areas – and some rural areas. The groups have carefully zoned spheres of control in the
poor areas of the cities, where they extort money under the guise of providing security.
Interestingly, some vigilante groups, though formed with good intentions of
community policing, are also falling into the habit of demanding money to provide
security. The failure of the police to eliminate these groups is spawning the expansion
of their activities and growth of new and relatively unknown groups. The amount of
money some of these groups control – through extortion – and relation with influential
individuals has emboldened them to act with impunity.
No Special Tribunal for Kenya
5. The government has not established a Special Tribunal for Kenya to try perpetrators of
the post-election violence. The failure and general inability of the Cabinet and
Parliament to establish the tribunal are pointers to concerted and unified efforts by
senior politicians to undermine the process of creating accountability with regard to
post-election violence. The indecisiveness that senior leaders demonstrate on this
matter is a pointer that politicians would rather have the matter swept under the carpet
than be dealt with. The failure to act implies that victims will not get justice and
perpetrators will not be punished.
The International Criminal Court
6. Kenyans are generally supportive of prosecution – including by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) -- of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the postelection violence. Almost half of the population in the post-election violence areas say
they will support the trials even if a senior member of their community is indicted for
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perpetrating violence. Many are also supportive of ICC intervention because they
believe there will be no justice for victims if the trials take place in the country.
7. The possibility of ICC intervention has resulted in heightened intimidation, harassment
and even murder of witnesses and human rights defenders. There are many potential
witnesses and human rights defenders who have been threatened with death. Cases of
murder have also been noted. Over 40 potential witnesses and/or human rights
defenders have gone into hiding fearing for their lives. This, on its own, raises the need
to establish a witness protection programme under the watch of the international
community and human rights defenders rather than the government.
Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees
8. The problems affecting IDPs are far from over. Not all IDPs have gone back to the areas
they were evicted from. Some continue to live in transition camps while others have
bought small parcels of land where they have basic shelter. The resettlement
programme itself has been assailed by allegations of corruption. Of concern, during this
quarter, is that the purchase of land for a few select IDPs exemplified poor coordination
and conflicts among the various ministries that have begun to show interest in this
issue.
9. In particular, the purchase of land to settle IDPs revealed poor inter-ministerial
coordination and politicisation of the resettlement programme. It also revealed lack of
mechanisms for accountability in the process: There are inter-ministerial conflicts over
how land was identified for buying and giving to select IDPs. Allegations of corruption
and discrimination in allocation of land to IDPs should be addressed. The National IDP
Policy, due to be formulated by March 2010, should designate a clear institutional
framework to address the IDP question.
10. Some Kenyan refugees still remain in Uganda. The reluctance of Kenyan refugees to
repatriate and continued existence of displaced persons are indicators that safe
conditions in return areas have not been restored. There is need for more peace
building in these areas and greater commitment to bring back the refugees.
11. Healing and reconciliation between different communities have been taking place very
slowly. Again, as mentioned in previous reports, approaches to healing and
reconciliation have been haphazard and uncoordinated. They lack the political profiling
to make them effective at the local level. The adoption and implementation of the
National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Transformation should be expedited to
consolidate and institutionalise the peace building agenda.
Lack of cohesion and coherence in government
12. The lack of coherence and cohesion within the Grand Coalition Government remains an
unresolved problem and is a matter of great concern. Political factionalism within the
individual parties has deepened these problems and resulted in creation of new ethnic
alliances whose main motive is to promote and protect political interests of ethnic
leaders and, at the same time, block critical reforms. Their opposition to accountability
for prosecution of perpetrators of post-election violence and impunity in general is very
apparent. This has resulted in individual interests subjugating national ones. To
promote individual interests, politicians are increasingly turning to their ethnic
constituencies and other parochial considerations. This has had the effect of
undermining pursuance of national political and especially the KDNR goal: promoting
peace, stability through the rule of law and respect for human rights.
13. Both sides of the coalition posit
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different

challenges

to

reforms.

They

appreciate the challenges to reforms from very different standpoints. Although there
have been regular consultations and meetings between the President and the Prime
Minister, these have not translated into real cohesion within the government. Their
allies who have vested interests in their party positions constantly undermine their
agreements and fail to implement key decisions/agreements, especially if such
decisions threaten the interests of dominant blocs and individuals in their parties
and/or their side of the government.
14. As a result, there is a great deal of agreement on numerous issues but very little action
in that regard or the actions take place slowly. Because of this, it is doubtful that the
two principals support each other in ensuring implementation of matters they agree
upon. Suspicions and mistrust characterise relations between not only ministers, but
also relations between some Permanent Secretaries and their ministers. In general, the
government lacks cohesion and coherence at different levels. The rise of new political
alliances formed along ethnic lines to promote personal interests is compounding this
problem.
No mechanism for resolving disputes

15. There are no effective mechanisms for resolving internal disputes within the coalition;
there is no structured mechanism for building consensus on important national issues.
The Committee for the Management of the Grand Coalition Affairs has not been
effective. Partly because of this and partly because of the need to resolve conflicts with
ease, the parties should consider appointing the inter-parties technical team that
facilitated the KNDR mediation to take charge of this role.
The constitutional review process
16. With regard to the constitutional review process, the Committee of Experts (CoE) has
already published a new Harmonised Draft Constitution for discussion by the public
and later by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). However, divisions within the
Grand Coalition Government and increased political factionalism make it difficult for
the parties to develop consensus on a number of contentious issues. This may further
delay the finalisation of the draft constitution. In the meantime, the term of the CoE is
due to expire by the end of March 2010, or 12 months after the date they were sworn in.
There is need, therefore, to extend the CoE’s term period beyond March 2010.
17. As mentioned in the previous report, the constitutional review process can fail because
of failure to carefully negotiate the vested interests around a Constitution. Political
actors have different preferences, which cannot be resolved through public debates.
The parties are yet to develop consensus on how to move forward. The differences
between the parties are likely to delay the process and alienate citizens from the review
process.
18. Institutional reforms in the rest of the Agenda 4 areas have begun but the focus is on
administrative aspects. The government must focus attention on broad policy and
institutional changes because reforms are not about transferring individuals from one
station to another. Neither are reforms only about organisational infrastructure.
Reforms are about change in policy and about transformation of institution and
behaviour. The proposals in the Harmonised Draft Constitution present an important
opportunity to regenerate the reform momentum.
Conclusion
19. The new political dynamics clearly pose a danger to reforms that the country has been
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trying to undertake. These individual interests and the new alliances have deflected
attention away from reforms. The small window that has remained open risks closing
prematurely. The constitutional review process, however, has created new hope and
will probably create a solid space for Kenyans to begin rebuilding institutions.
20. The review process, therefore, must be insulated from these parochial interests. There
is need for a coalition of interests across parties and within the broader civil society to
protect the review process and ensure that it does not stall. The new alliances that are
emerging and their campaign for 2012 could close the only small window that was
remaining to enable the government to make decisions. Political expediency and the
personal interests of leaders, rather than national interests, appear to be guiding major
events in the country. The constitution review remains the main opportunity for
rekindling hope for the nation’s future.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

1.

Kenya experienced unprecedented violent conflict following the disputed December 2007
General Election. The mediation by the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African
Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan resulted in the two main parties
– the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) – agreeing
on a number of steps to address the crisis.

2.

Under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) forum, the parties
signed the ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’ on
28 February 2008. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was enacted
soon after.

3.

The parties committed to undertake a set of actions to achieve the goal of the KNDR:
Achieving sustainable peace, stability and justice through rule of law and respect for
human rights.

4.

This report is the fifth review of progress in implementing the Kenya National Dialogue
and Reconciliation agreements. Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org.
This report covers the period between October and December 2009.

5.

The report has been developed from data collected using several methods. The research
team interviewed various respondents with knowledge on the various agenda items. In
addition, a survey on the prevailing situation in the regions affected by the post-election
violence was carried out. The survey comprised a significant sample size of IDPs.

6.

The report has also relied on secondary sources of information, including reports by the
government, humanitarian agencies as well as the media. Secondary sources, however,
have been integrated into the report with caution: corroboration through primary data
sources has informed the extent to which some of the findings are integrated into the
review. Once again, the review has taken care to remain objective and to let the data
speak for itself, knowing too well that analysing progress is sensitive to personal vested
interests and political realities.

7.

The report is divided into sections corresponding to the agenda items under the KNDR
agreement.
(a) Section II: Agenda Item 1 on actions to end violence and restore fundamental
rights.
(b) Section III: Agenda Item 2 – Addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting
healing and reconciliation.
(c) Section IV discusses Agenda Item 3 on power sharing, which was agreed upon as
a means of ending the political crisis.
(d) Section V discusses Agenda Item 4 on addressing long-standing issues.
(e) Section VI: Some conclusions based on the main findings on each agenda item.
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2 AGENDA ITEM 1: IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STOP VIOLENCE AND
RESTORE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

Introduction
8.

Agenda 1 of the KNDR sought to immediately end the post-election violence and restore
fundamental rights and liberties. The previous reports noted that post-election violence
ended in all affected areas and relative calm obtained? after the two parties agreed to
form a Coalition Government in February 2008.

9.

Findings from early 2009 have repeatedly shown that there is calm in many areas and
that over half of the population is confident that violence will not recur. This optimism
obtained? during the last quarter of 2009. The progress made towards getting a new
Constitution continued to reinforce this optimism.

10. This quarterly report for the period between October and December 2009 examines the
status of security and why it is deteriorating. The report pays special attention to
security. This is because previous reports showed that security was deteriorating in
different parts of the country and that illegal groups were very much in place.
Key findings
Summary
•

Illegal groups multiply, collect money through extortion rackets; all forms of
crime increase.

•

Resource-based conflicts and cattle-rustling escalate in Northern Kenya districts,
National Steering Committee organises a retreat to discuss insecurity.

•

Apparent inter-departmental incoherence and general institutional failure
prevent government from curbing insecurity.

•

International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor’s interest in the Kenya situation
attracts threats against witnesses in post-election violence cases; no progress
made in ensuring justice for PEV victims.

•

Little progress made to establish a Special Tribunal and in the fight against
impunity despite international pressure.

The Deteriorating Security Situation
11.

The previous review of progress paid particular attention to the deteriorating security
situation in the country. The reports noted that the post-election violence was halted
after the parties signed the agreement and formed the Coalition Government. However,
new forms of crime, such as extortion, emerged to take the place of the political violence.
Illegal armed groups proliferated and acted with impunity. Resource-based conflicts in
different parts of the country increased in tandem with deepening drought in pastoral
areas. More people were feeling unsafe toward the beginning of the last quarter of 2009.

12.

The reports noted that it is difficult to disband illegal groups because they enjoy the
support of some political leaders and sustain themselves through criminal activities.
Also, the police lack adequate capacity to deal with them. Lack of policy guidelines also
makes it difficult to eradicate these groups. Further, victims of crime do not provide
evidence to sustain prosecutions. Complicity by police officers was also highlighted as a
major obstacle to the elimination of these groups. Failure to effectively address
challenges has resulted in illegal groups conducting their activities with impunity and, in
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some instances, threatening security officials.2
13. Findings in this quarter reveal three aspects of these groups and insecurity that appear to
be interrelated. One, community policing through vigilantes is turning into a source of
insecurity for communities. Two, illegal groups as well as vigilantes demand payment for
security in poor neighbourhoods. Three, illegal groups have transformed into extortion
gangs; they control millions of shillings in revenue from extortion and other criminal
activities and investments. These three interrelated trends are discussed below.
Illegal groups ‘providing security’
14. Field data show that gangs have flourished under the guise of ‘providing security.’
Vigilantes are also transforming into gangs and their activities are not different from
those of illegal armed militia. They kill suspects or torture them. The manner in which
some of them conduct their activities has distorted the meaning and practice of
community policing.
15.

The rise of vigilantism has led to an increase in crime levels in some areas. Vigilantism as
a deterrence strategy in Nairobi and Central provinces has failed to fill the security gap.
Combined with the police failure to deal with insecurity, this has led people to employ
extreme forms of violence against suspects. Tacit official recognition of this flawed form
of community policing is undermining the rule of law and making violence against
victims look normal or acceptable to the society. It is gradually leading to a situation
where people accept these informal groups in the society thereby leading to compliance
and allegiance to the gangs. People in some areas now tend to see the police as slow,
inept, corrupt and unlikely to convict criminals or deliver justice to victims.

16. As noted in the report of the taskforce on police reforms and during the field survey for
this quarter, the police force’s capacity for rapid response is hindered by communication
and logistical challenges such as lack of vehicles, fuel and impassable roads. Police
stations are understaffed and lack equipment. Allegedly, senior officers take money
allocated for telephone communication away without accounting for it.3 People complain
of police failures in assisting them: ‘If you go to the police, they ask you to buy fuel for
them to travel to the crime scene, or they ask you for airtime to call their seniors. Other
times they tell you they will come to investigate but they don’t come. Most of the times,
nothing is done or the criminals are set free for lack of evidence.’4
17.

These operational challenges suggest again the need to fast-track radical policy and
institutional changes within the security sector in its entirety. Urgency is required
because the country is approaching important political watersheds: a possible
referendum on a new Constitution; and intensification of campaigns for the 2012 General
Election. The security sector ought to be fully and urgently transformed to act in line with
the KNDR goal: promote peace, stability and justice through rule of law and respect for
human rights.
Security on sale

18. Security has been commoditised. The government and communities designed
community policing as a voluntary, self-help initiative by neighbourhood members but
self-styled vigilantes have turned it into a commodity for sale. Individuals, households
and businesses pay for personal safety and protection of property. Vigilantes, organised
as security units, attack or destroy the property of individuals or households that are
unwilling to pay.
19. In the poor areas of Nairobi, these groups have advanced their extortion rackets to all
sectors of the economy. Tenants and landlords pay varying amounts of money to these
2

Interviews with security officers in Kibera, Kayole and Dandora in Nairobi, October and November 2009
Interview with a police officer in Eldoret, 8 October 2009
4
Interview in Kibera, 29 October 2009
3
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groups. Residential houses or businesses located in better-off neighbourhoods pay more.
Notwithstanding the difficulties of corroborating such information, field data indicates
that the illegal fees charged for protection vary from one neighbourhood to another and
from one type and size of business to another.
20. These forms of extortion stifle investment. Indeed, many businesses are unable to cope.5
Conversely, extortion has become attractive as a source of income for the unemployed
youth in urban areas. This has implications for the organisation of economic activities at
the local level.
Extortion gangs and the economy
21.

The September 2009 review report noted that political ‘goons for hire’ had mutated into
organised criminal gangs. The findings show that the groups have turned into extortion
gangs. In addition to the transport sector, extortion gangs have also permeated the
building and construction industry (targeting developers, quarries and transporters),
residential estates, businesses and markets. In Nairobi slums, new investors in the public
transport sector have to pay huge sums of money (Ksh50,000) to be allowed to operate
on certain routes.

Table 1: Illegal taxation of public transport vehicles in Kibera and Eastlands
Extortion gang/ amount per day (Ksh) in Kibera
Vehicle Labour
Bumps
Karanja
Olympic Kaberenge
type
Youth
Ahead
Youth
Matatu
50
50
50
100
30
Bus
100
100
50
100
50
Mungiki/ amount per day (Ksh) in Eastlands6
Kayole
Mathare
Dandora
Matatu
300
400
500
Mini
600
500
1000
bus

Total per/
day (Ksh)
280
400

Source: Field data, November/December 2009

22. Extortion rackets in the public transport industry have a huge impact on the national
economy. On the basis of estimates by those in the transport industry, the amount of
money lost to criminal gangs through extortion is quite significant. According to
estimates by the Matatu Owners Association, the 15,000 public service vehicles, in
Nairobi and environs, lose Ksh10.5 million per day to extortion rackets. This amount,
collected from only one sector in one province, translates into about Ksh3.5 billion per
year.
23. The illegal groups are adding new services to their ‘security’ role. They are involved in
solving disputes at the community and family level. They are slowly seeking to legitimise
themselves by providing certain services that the state is not providing. One person
noted, for example, ‘If your wife reports that you beat her or misuse money without
providing for the family, they look for you and give you a thorough beating. You
continue to pay fines until your wife reports that you have reformed!’7
24.

Tens of extortion gangs have emerged and diversified their targets and areas of
operation. Field data in informal settlements in Nairobi, Central and Nyanza provinces

5

Informal interview with a matatu driver, Eastleigh, where a vehicle was burnt in August 2009 when the crew
refused to remit illegal taxes.
6
Mungiki has monopolised public transport in Eastlands; other groups such as ‘Wailer’, ‘Thaai’ and ‘Taliban’
focus on ‘security’, solving disputes and the building and construction industry.
7
Interview with a woman in Kibera, 29 October 2009
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indicate that in addition to older illegal groups such as Mungiki, Taliban, Bukhungu,
Baghdad and Kamjesh, new groups with similar tactics have emerged.
25. The media and the public have focused on Mungiki and other well-known groups. This
has made it easy for the new groups to deepen their extortion activities. In Kibera, for
instance, new groups collect illegal taxes from public transport vehicles at designated
points along the road. Those unwilling to pay are banned from plying the route. The table
below shows common names used by these groups.

Table 2: New Illegal Groups in Urban Informal Settlements
Nairobi West (Kibera)
Yes We Can
Siafu
Haki Yetu
14 Gendarmerie
12 Flamingos
12 Disciples
Bunkers
Kosovo

Dego Youths
40 Ndugus
Bumps Ahead
Kaberenge Youth
ODM Youths
Karanja Youths
Darajani
Jipange

Tuff Gong

Super 14

Nairobi
North
Thaai
Wailer

Central
The Hague
Kenda Kenda
Bantu
Ngoroko

Nyanza
Nyalenda Base
The Chief Squad
Nyamasaria Massive
Baghdad for Peace
Karamojong Boys
Saba Saba
Artur Margaryan
Kebago

Source: Field data, October/November 2009

26. The previous review of progress reports observed that the government had not
successfully disbanded illegal groups because of lack of political will and police lacking
the capacity for the task. During this quarter, findings show that politically organised
armed militia are not in place in a manner similar to the early 2008 period. As argued in
the past, the groups have mutated into criminal gangs or are simply idle because there
are no “political jobs”. Many people now attest that there are no such groups in their
area. This is indicative of a situation in which there are no groups financed to do political
battles. Our survey showed that many respondents did not know of armed groups in their
area.
Figure1: To your knowledge, have local armed groups been completely disbanded or
demobilised in your area?
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27. The view that politicians finance these groups has not changed. Asked who they thought
supported these groups, 47 per cent of the respondents named the politicians. In
February 2009, close to 40 per cent of the respondents had again identified politicians as
the financiers of illegally armed groups. Business people finance these groups, too, with
23 per cent of Internally Displaced Persons sample naming them for providing such
support.

Table 3: In your opinion, who do you think finances armed groups?
(November/December 2009)
Total

IDP

General

Politicians

46%

42%

47%

Business people

17%

23%

15%

15%

17%

15%

12%

13%

11%

Ordinary citizens

4%

2%

5%

Community elders

3%

3%

4%

Government

2%

0%

2%

None

1%

0%

1%

Self
financing
groups
Don't know

by

28. Asked what the best way to disband these groups is, 33 per cent of the respondents would
prefer prosecution of their leaders while 25 per cent would support the creation of
employment for the youth.
Figure 2: What is the best way to disband illegal groups?

29. These responses suggest an increase in the importance the public attaches to prosecuting
the leaders of illegal groups and those involved in financing their operations. During field
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surveys, respondents have often emphasised the importance of prosecution of politicians
and business people who finance the groups alongside the leaders of these groups as an
important measure of ending violence. These responses suggest the need for urgency in
prosecuting those involved in the post-election violence..
Security and Impunity
Increasing threats against witnesses
30. A point to stress is that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) visited
Kenya in early November 2009 to seek State referral of the Kenyan situation. Following
the visit, security for potential witnesses has become a matter of great concern. Many
have been warned against giving information to any investigative body or even the Truth,
Justice and Reconciliation Commission.8 Several people, including an MP and human
rights defenders, have received death threats.9 Over 40 potential witnesses and human
rights defenders have gone into hiding. Some have disappeared. Others have been
killed.10 Some senior politicians are believed to be behind these threats and
intimidation.11 In Rift Valley Province, local radio stations have begun broadcasting
inflammatory statements against the prosecution of post-election violence suspects.12
31. Continued intimidation of potential witnesses and human rights defenders continues to
raise concern. Absence of an effective witness protection mechanism implies even more
challenges for witnesses. This raises a need to expedite the process of investigation and
prosecution of perpetrators of the violence. It also raises the need to speed up
establishing of a functional witness protection programme.
32. In spite of these threats, the public is generally supportive of prosecution of those behind
the post-election violence. Less than 5 per cent would resort to violent acts against
members of other communities if those prosecuted came from their communities.
Figure 3: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election
violence, how will you personally react?

33. These responses suggest that prosecution of those who incited post-election violence is
unlikely to trigger violence and impunity. On their own, ordinary citizens would want to
see an end to the culture of political violence. They prefer trials, including those of their
own leaders.
8

Interview with a victim of the post-election violence in Eldoret, 4 October, 2009
The Star, 25 November 2009, ‘Imanyara gets extra security’
10
The Standard, 7 December 2009, ‘Activists seek funds to protect PEV witness’
11
The Star, 18 November 2009, ‘Politicians intimidating poll violence witness’
12
Daily Nation, 4 November 2009, ‘Ban FM Stations fanning ethnicity’, says activist.
9
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34. Indeed, as many as 62 per cent of the people in the areas affected by post-election
violence think violence will not recur over the next 12 months. And if violence were to
occur, 48 per cent say their communities will organise themselves for self-defence. This
again implies that violence would assume ethnic dimension. Only 13 per cent would
support peace and reconciliation efforts. Another 17 per cent of the respondents say they
do not know what they would do while only 14 per cent would seek security from the
police. Interestingly, 26 per cent of IDPs say they would not know what to do, and only 12
per cent of them would report to the authorities.
35. These responses are worrisome because ‘self-defence’ implies willingness to fight back or
even to undertake retaliatory measures in the event of one being attacked. The violence
would be ethnic. Inaction against the perpetrators of violence could be contributing to
these feelings. If action had been taken, the public would be confident that the
government would act.
State failures in ending impunity
36. Both Parliament and the Cabinet have failed to establish a Special Tribunal for Kenya to
try those involved in the post-election violence. This failure is indicative of united efforts
by a group of senior and influential politicians to sweep under the carpet matters to do
with post-election violence. There is scant attention to justice for the victims.
37. A Cabinet that has failed to provide a clear direction on the matter and a Parliament that
is divided on the issue are only indicative of the numerous hurdles likely to emerge for
the ICC intervention. It is possible that this unity by senior politicians against a Special
Tribunal will again be reinforced to counter the ICC intervention.
38. But the general population, including IDPs, supports ICC intervention. Over half of the
population would prefer ICC to intervene, with 80 per cent of IDPs also preferring the
ICC to the Special Tribunal.

Table 4: Should those individuals responsible for post-election violence be tried
through a local tribunal/ international community in The Hague or both?
Place of trial
Total
19%
63%

Local tribunal
ICC/Hague
Both local tribunal and the
ICC/Hague
Shouldn't be tried
DK
RTA

5%
10%
4%
0%

% respondent
IDP
General Sample
6%
22%
80%
57%
5%
6%
3%
0%

5%
11%
4%
0%

39. The international community has sustained pressure on Kenya to end impunity and
expedite reforms. In October 2009, the United States imposed a visa ban on the Attorney
General and said three other individuals would also be banned from entering the US. The
move was supported by several other foreign missions in Nairobi.
40. The entry of the ICC has altered the political landscape: politicians from the Kalenjin and
Kikuyu communities have emerged as the principal voices in discourses on post-election
violence perpetrators. The debate, on whether to punish the perpetrators or not, has
transformed into an early political campaign and positioning for 2012. Politicians have
delved into self-preservation strategies by mobilising ethnic sentiments and voicing
threats of violence. They are mobilising communities to advance their interests in the
hope that they can thus protect their personal political interests and careers in the name
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of their ethnic communities. These dynamics may hamper the effectiveness of the ICC
intervention in the fight against impunity.
New forms of violence: Conflicts over resources and boundaries
41. During the reporting period, conflicts over water and pasture and cattle rustling had
escalated in the pastoral areas. Dialogue and traditional peace methods appear to be

ineffective because of politicisation of traditional dispute resolution structures and use of
modern weapons.
42. According to statistics compiled by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) in Kenya, over 350 people have been killed in pastoral areas in 2009.
Violent clashes in Isiolo, Tana River and the Suguta Valley in North Rift escalated.

Figure 4: Killings in Pastoral Areas

43. The conflict map below shows the various forms of conflict in the country during 2009.
In particular, the map shows that resource-based conflicts (over water, pasture and land)
and illegal groups are the main source of insecurity in the country.
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44. The map shows that cattle-rustling is the most prevalent cause of insecurity in the North
Rift, particularly in the Suguta Valley. The practice has periodically displaced thousands
of people and hampered the delivery of social services. For instance, attacks in November
2009 displaced over 800 households and 30 teachers in East Baringo.13 Similar violent
clashes have been reported in Samburu, Turkana, Isiolo and Meru North. Bad roads, lack
of vehicles and insufficient intelligence hinder state capacity to deal with cattle rustling.14
Conflicts over land are also an endemic problem in several parts of the country as shown

in the map.
45. These are not post-election violence cases. However, insecurity in any form -- when past
cases have not been punished -- could intensify conflict in the country. Moreover, these
conflicts are usually the cause of arms flows into the country. The spread and
intensification of these conflicts, at a time when there have been allegations of
communities arming themselves, are of great concern. Already, one case of arms caches
in Rift Valley involving a business person and a senior security official is being
prosecuted. The conflicts and reports of armament are a pointer that the conditions
giving rise to different forms of conflict in the country are yet to be addressed. They are a
pointer of failure by security services to provide protection to Kenyans.
Summary and Conclusion
46. This review has highlighted several findings. It has shown that insecurity remains an
issue of concern and illegal groups have rapidly transformed into extortion gangs.
Extortion is a steady source of income for these groups. The resources they have and the
failures on the part of the police to eliminate these groups are firmly embedding these
groups at the local level. These findings call for urgent implementation of security sector
reforms.
47. International and local pressure to end impunity for the post-election violence has
triggered renewed threats and intimidation against witnesses, human rights defenders
and some of the politicians demanding prosecution of perpetrators of violence. These
threats and the killing of potential witnesses raise the need to urgently set up a functional
and independent witness protection system. Given the government’s failure to take
effective measures against perpetrators of violence and the failure to protect witnesses,
such a programme should be established under the watch of the international
community and human rights defenders.
48. Increasing demand to fight impunity has led to senior politicians from especially Central
Kenya and the Rift Valley consolidating new ethno-political alliances. This, on its own, is
meant to defeat attempts to hold politicians to account. These are manoeuvres meant to
deflect attention from critical reforms and actions meant to end impunity. The survey
shows that many Kenyans are supportive of ICC intervention and prosecution in general
because of the inability and unwillingness of the government to prosecute perpetrators of
violence.
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Interview with senior officer of the Provincial Administration, Rift Valley, 4 October 2009; see also Daily
Nation, 9 November 2009 ‘Candidates’ families in plea for more security’
Interview with a security research NGO in Nairobi, 24 October 2009; see also The Standard, 25 November
2009 ‘Police trapped in bandit zones’
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AGENDA ITEM 2: ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS,
PROMOTING NATIONAL HEALING AND RECONCILIATION

Introduction
49. Agenda Item 2 of the KNDR focused on addressing the humanitarian crisis and
promoting national healing and reconciliation. Review of progress made in the
rehabilitation of IDPs has shown that not all displaced persons have been able to go back
to their homes. Previous reports also noted that national-level political conflicts tended
to trickle to the local level, thereby making reconciliation more difficult to achieve.
Insecurity, poor reconciliation between communities, conflicts among national political
leaders, among other factors, have hampered the safe return of IDPs to their homes.
50. This report reviews progress in resettling IDPs and promoting healing and reconciliation
during the period between October and December 2009.
Key Findings
Summary of findings
•

All formal camps closed, but some 19000 IDPs remain in tented transition camps

•

President directs that IDPs be allocated land, but directive triggers a crisis of
inter-ministerial coordination and highlights the political dynamics that
characterise IDP resettlement

•

National Policy on IDPs to be formulated by March 2010

•

Government launches a Peace-Building and Conflict Transformation Policy

•

86 Kenyan refugee households repatriate from Uganda; majority unwilling to
come back due to fear and landlessness

•

Since the beginning of Operation Rudi Nyumbani, a total of 152,626 IDPs, half of
those who were in camps, have received the Ksh 10,000 start up assistance. 7000
IDPs are yet to receive the funds

•

28,744 households (38 percent) out of about 78,254 have received Ksh 25,000
from the Government for shelter reconstruction.

•

Donors have reconstructed 14,090 houses

Resettlement of IDPs
51.

15
16

The government’s IDP resettlement programme, ‘Operation Rudi Nyumbani’, was aimed
at closing all camps and assisting people to return to their homes. But the closure of
official camps has not translated into an end to displacement. Some IDPs continue to live
in transit camps because of insecurity. Although statistics from the Ministry of Special
Programmes show that there are still 26 transit camps with about 3,648 households of
December 2009,15 a rapid assessment by the National Council of Churches of Kenya
(NCC) found that there were 76 such camps with about 19,000 IDPs.16 Partly responsible
for difference in figures is that the Ministry recognises the camps with IDPs who are yet
to receive the relief assistance camps. Other camps are relatively small and are located
adjacent to one another. All these are a challenge to enumeration. Notwithstanding these
reasons, it is important for the Ministry to conduct a detailed assessment to establish the
Ministry of Special Programmes, IDP Status Brief as at 3 Dec 2009, p 2
ibid
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actual number of transit camps and the number of IDPs in these camps.
52. Of concern is that the IDPs live in generally dilapidated tents and poor conditions. Field
survey and a rapid assessment by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)
reveal that the camps have dilapidated tents and poor infrastructure17. UNHCR was
providing plastic sheeting in December 2009 pending the construction of houses.18 The
conditions under which the IDPs live deteriorated considerably during the rainy season
in November and December 2009.
Uncoordinated resettlement efforts
53. In early October, the President directed that all remaining camps be closed and the
remaining IDPs allocated land. The ministries of Internal Security, Finance, Lands and
Special Programmes then began disjointed and uncoordinated initiatives to identify land
to buy and settle the IDPs. Before completing the land purchase procedures, 705
households were relocated from Mawingu camp in Central Province to three farms in the
Rift Valley: Giwa in Rongai (530), Ndatho in Subukia (113) and Mawingu in Molo (61).19
The government also identified 6,802 IDP households to receive 2.5 acres of land each.
Those identified to receive land included mainly those who had already bought small
plots of land for shelter through collective self-help initiatives. The government
interpreted this to mean genuine interest by the IDPs to acquire their own land and,
therefore, decided to complement their efforts20.
54. The relocation of IDPs before legal transfer of land has raised concerns about the legality
of the resettlement, particularly because the Ministry of Lands announced that it was yet
to finalise procuring any of the identified land. Thus IDPs have no secure rights in these
holdings.21 The IDPs have no sale agreements or land allocation documents. They are
living in a camp-like settlement awaiting land demarcation and subdivision. Some are
sceptical about the possibility of getting the 2.5 acres.22
Inter-ministry conflicts over resettlement
55. The executive decision to award land to IDPs threw the work plan and budget of the
Ministry of Special Programmes into disarray. In June, the Ministry was allocated Ksh2.2
billion for the 2009/2010 budget year, with which it was to pay about 7,012 households
their start-up funds of Ksh10,000 and another 49,529 families their shelter
reconstruction funds of Ksh25,000.23 These plans have been shelved as Ksh1.4 billion or
64 per cent of the ministry’s budget was transferred to the Ministry of Lands to purchase
land for IDPs. Thus, the Ministry of Special Programmes is operating on a financial
deficit with regard to the resettlement of IDPs.24 This is a concern for IDPs who had
acquired their plots of land on credit, hoping to pay once they received the funds from
the government.25
56. The directive to give land to IDPs was met with great relief by IDPs, many of whom have
remained in closed camps because they were landless and did not have anywhere else to
go. Providing land to the IDPs is indeed one solution to their plight as shown in the
17

NCCK Monitoring Report for the month of November 2009
Discussions at the Protection Working Group meeting, December 3, 2009; interviews, senior official,
Ministry of Special Programmes, December 2009
19
Interview with the Ministry of Special Programs, December 2009
18

20

Ibid
Interview with official at the Ministry of Lands, 7 November 2009; also Daily Nation, ‘No deal yet on IDP
settlement, says Orengo’
22
Interview with the National IDP Network, 6 December 2009
23
Ministry of Special Programs, IDP Status Brief as at 3 December 2009, p3-4
24
Interview with senior official, Ministry of Special Programmes
25
Interviews with IDPs ALKO camp in Rongai, October 2009; interview with representative of National IDP
Network, 14 December 2009; KHRC, Out in the Cold: The Fate of IDPs in Kenya, 2009, p. 44-47
21
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survey findings.
Table 5: What are the most important permanent solutions to IDP problems?
Total
IDP
General
Promote healing and reconciliation
39%
49%
36%
Give them land
26%
30%
25%
Give them financial assistance
18%
16%
19%
End impunity
7%
3%
8%
Others
6%
1%
7%
Don’t know
2%
0%
2%
Have an IDP policy
1%
0%
2%
57. Allocating land to IDPs highlighted the politics of resettlement at different levels. At the
national level, lack of inter-ministerial coordination emerged amid allegations of
embezzlement of IDP funds. The Ministry of Internal Security in August 2009 conducted
an internal audit of the disbursement of the Humanitarian Fund, which revealed the loss
of about Ksh180m.26 Reacting to these revelations, the Ministry of Special Programmes
charged that the Provincial Administration staff disbursed the funds. The exchanges in
the media reinforced earlier findings that there were poor inter-ministerial coordination
and accountability mechanisms for managing the Humanitarian Fund. In December
2009, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and the Kenya Human Rights
Commission released separate reports underlining this weakness.27
58. Also at the ministerial level, an interest in participating in disbursing the money or
allocating land to IDPs acquired a political dimension as efforts to alienate the Ministry
of Special Programmes became evident. For instance, there were allegations of officials in
Treasury, the Ministries of Agriculture, Lands, and Internal Security being increasingly
involved in identifying land to resettle IDPs without involving the Ministry of Special
Programmes.28 There were allegations that the land was not competitively sourced:
officials identified land owned by powerful and politically influential individuals and paid
high prices for it. At the local level, the relocation of IDPs to Rongai was greeted with
hostility as politicians in the area alleged a broader political ploy to change the electoral
demography of the constituency.29 These perceptions have created tension and some
observers believe violence in the region is inevitable.30
Reconstruction of shelter
59. In the period between October and December 2009, the government had given
Ksh10,000 each to about 19,000 households as relief and assistance funds. About
152,626 IDPs have so far received the Ksh.10,000 relief and assistance fund. This
represents about half of those who were in camps – 350,000 IDPs were in 118 camps at
the time of the political violence; another 313921 had integrated into local communities.
By 3 December 2009, the Ministry of Special Programmes had disbursed Ksh25,000
shelter reconstruction funds to about 38 per cent of 78,000 homes that required
reconstruction.31 The Ministry also received construction materials from China to rebuild
houses for IDPs once they are relocated to the land promised by the government.32
26

Interview with senior government official, 16 November 2009
KNCHR Press release ‘Outcome of KNCHR assessment of GOK resettlement programme of IDPs and
corruption allegations’ 2 December 2009; KHRC, op cit
28
Discussion at a Protection Cluster Meeting in November2009
29
Interview with a politician from the Rift Valley in Nairobi, 19 November 2009
30
Interview with official of the Provincial Administration in Rongai, 7 October 2009
31
MOSSP, IDP status report, 3 December 2009, p. 4
32
Interview with official at the Ministry of Special Programmes, 3 December 2009
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International development partners and other donors have also assisted in the
reconstruction of houses. By end of December 2009, donors had reconstructed 14090
houses. This represents about 71 percent of the total houses (19976 houses) that donors
had pledged to construct for IDPs.
60. An issue of concern is that houses constructed for IDPs in Ndeffo, Mauche and parts
Kuresoi were vandalised and some of the returning IDPs chased away.33 Inter-communal
tension has also increased in the area because of the ongoing eviction of illegal settlers
from the Mau Forest. Shortly after the evictions began in October 2009, two returnees
were found murdered in their home in Molo. The ensuing tension halted the return
process and reversed the gains made by peace and reconciliation efforts in the area.34
61. Previous reports noted that IDPs are viewed as a concern of one community rather than a
national concern and that their value fluctuates depending on their perceived utility as a
political resource. Although their value in the past has been minimal because they are
‘nobody’s constituents’,35 this seems to be changing. As noted above, the relocation of
IDPs to lands purchased in central Rift Valley seems to alter the ethnic population
distribution pattern, which could have electoral implications.36 Other observers think
there is a deliberate move to use the IDPs to create a ‘buffer-zone’ between the areas
controlled by rival ethnic groups in the Rift Valley.37
62. The Protection Working Group is formulating a National Policy on IDPs, expected to be
ready by the end of March 2010, with the consent of the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Special Programmes. The group has received programme capacity support
from the office of the UN Special Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs, who
visited the country in November 2009. The Policy will aim to domesticate the IC/GLR
Protocols on the Protection and Assistance to IDPs and the 2009 African Union
Convention on the Protection and Assistance of IDPs. Interestingly, IDPs themselves do
not think the policy will provide sustainable solution to their plight. They are emphatic
that prosecution of those who perpetrate violence is an important solution. Thus IDP
problem is a political rather than a legal problem.
63. These findings also show that the IDP issue is far from resolved. Resettlement is giving
rise to new politics and providing opportunities for corruption by government officials.
The fact that IDPs appeared forgotten for a while could be contributing to this: they are
only seen as a political resource and no one appears to have had any strong interest in
their resettlement.
Illegal occupancy of houses
64. All past review reports have highlighted the plight of landlords and structure owners who
are unable to return to or access their property due to illegal occupancy of their houses in
Kibera slums as well as some parts of Nakuru and Kisumu. This problem remains
because the control of slums is in the hands of illegally armed groups with alleged
complicity of some provincial administration officials. Protracted loss of access to income
from rent has undermined their livelihoods. It is additional to tension in the area.38
Kenyan refugees in Uganda repatriating
65. During the study period, 86 Kenyan refugee households repatriated to Kenya from
Uganda. The return was encouraged by the announcement in October that displaced
people would receive land. According to UNHCR in Uganda, the majority of those who
33

The new iron roofing sheets, doors and windows were removed and threatening messages left for the owners.

34

NCCK, November Monthly report, November 2009
35
Kamungi, P. 2009. ‘The Politics of Displacement in Multi-party Kenya’, JCAS 2009
36
Interview with a lawyer in Nakuru, 5 October 2009
37
Interview with a political scientist in Nairobi, 13 December 2009
38
Interview with members of ‘legitimate’ community policing in Kibera, November 2009
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had registered to return changed their minds when they learnt that they would not
receive land from the government.39 Those who returned received US$50 from UNHCR
in Uganda, and Ksh35,000 in Kenya once they were received by Kenyan authorities at
the Malaba border point in Western Province. According to some refugees in
Kiryandongo, some of the registered refugees who had left the camp returned to Uganda
to register for voluntary repatriation in order to access the money.40
66. Although the government is aware of Kenyan refugees in Uganda, it has not made any
contact with them. The refugees complain that they have not received any visits, nor has
any government official spoken to them or given them assistance to return to Kenya.
Healing and Reconciliation
67. Three months after the government began the IDP resettlement programme, another
initiative dubbed Operation Ujirani Mwema’ (Good Neighbourliness) was started. This
was followed by Operation Tujenge Pamoja (Let Us Build Together) to expedite the
reconstruction of destroyed homes and infrastructure. Individual politicians began peace
activities such as Operation Karibu Nyumbani (Welcome Back Home). Several media
organisations, such as Citizen Television and Media Focus in Africa Foundation,
sponsored the production and broadcasting of peace and reconciliation programmes,41
while NGOs facilitated peace meetings and training workshops. The government initiated
the District Peace Committees, and in July established the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission as well as the National Cohesion and Integration Cohesion in
September.
68. The government has launched a National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict
Transformation. The policy, which is before the Cabinet, is a positive step in
consolidating peace work. These are important initiatives, given that reconciliation and
healing are taking place rather slowly especially among communities in the post-election
violence area. The policy will also put in place the relevant strategies for this because past
efforts were haphazard.
69. The survey sought perceptions about healing and reconciliation. Most problematically,
respondents do not think communities have reconciled after the post-election violence.
Only 5 per cent of IDPs think communities have reconciled “a lot” with 43 per cent of
them saying “only a little” and 51 per cent saying “not at all.” This surely contributes to
continued feelings of isolation on the part of the IDP community, who are not likely to
feel welcome in certain parts of Kenya given a lack of reconciliation.

39
40
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Interview in Masindi District, Uganda, 16 October 2009
Interviews with Kenyan refugees in Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement, October 16, 2009
For instance, the ‘Fist to Five’ weekly programme on Citizen Television
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Figure 5: Thinking about reconciliation among Kenyan communities after the post-election
violence, how much would you say communities have reconciled?

70. The survey asked respondents about challenges to healing and reconciliation. Overall,

about one quarter of the population in post-election violence areas think that tribalism is a
major challenge. About a similar number think it is political statements.
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Table 6: What are the most important challenges to healing and reconciliation efforts
in your area?

71.

Total

IDP

General

Tribalism

24%

25%

24%

Political statements

21%

24%

20%

Mistrust between ethnic groups

20%

21%

19%

Land disputes
People who committed the violence are still
free

13%

11%

14%

8%

9%

8%

Lack of involvement by community members

7%

4%

9%

People are too hurt and traumatized

5%

4%

5%

Taken together, these responses show that inter-communal tensions remain a significant
impediment to progress in the eyes of the public.

72. The December 2009 survey report shows that 47 per cent of IDPs ‘get along well with
other people’. This is because IDPs are finding themselves in ethnically-homogenous
areas where they are not likely to have tension with their kinsmen. This explains the
IDPs’ reluctance to return to pre-displacement areas.
73. The skepticism about the impact of peace initiatives is a significant departure from
February 2009, when 33 per cent thought these efforts had been very successful and 58
per cent rated them as ‘somewhat successful’. This suggests most likely that
reconciliation activities have declined overall, citizens are less aware of them now than
they were earlier in the year, or they are no longer eliciting the desired outcome.
Figure 6: How successful are the efforts at promoting healing and reconciliation among
communities in your area?

18%

5%

51%

26%

General
20%

17%

30%

Very successful

32%

IDP
19%

43%

10%
27%

Total

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Somewhat
successful
Not successful

100%

74. Local discourses on healing and reconciliation indicate an underlying demand for
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restorative justice. IDPs, who say healing and reconciliation is yet to happen, argue that
those who looted their homes and took away their livestock and furniture should return
the property before a genuine dialogue of forgiveness and a new beginning can start. ‘The
problem is that those who took our property during the violence want to keep it and say
we have forgiven each other. How possible is that? They should bring it back, ask for
forgiveness and let us be honest. How can you trust people who always eat their
words?’42
75. Another concern affecting reconciliation is identities of outsiders (IDPs) and natives. The
perception of ‘domination by outsiders’ informs the demand that such outsiders should
not hold leadership positions because it is tantamount to domination of the indigenous
communities. According to interviews in Bomet, for instance, the local people expressed
resentment against migrants’ apparent reluctance to mix or be assimilated into the local
culture. Communities that have come to view themselves as natives to a region demand
that migrants or ‘outsiders’ should learn the local language, ‘vote with us’43 and not seek
elective posts to rule over the indigenous people. In some return areas such as Kipkelion,
IDPs have reportedly agreed to abide by these demands as a precondition for peaceful coexistence.44
76. Reconciliation and healing, on the basis of these findings and past reports, appear to be
taking place very slowly. Of course, the haphazard manner in which leaders have
approached it in the past has contributed to this pace. But of interest is that political
leaders at the national level are no longer focused on healing of communities. A national
programme of healing and reconciliation that should have had the two principals
working from the front and visiting the post-election violence areas has never taken off.
Political factionalism within the Orange Democratic Movement has also brought to the
fore a new dimension and new actors, which should be considered in addressing healing
and reconciliation. The divisions between some Rift Valley MPs and the Prime Minister,
who is the leader of the party, are new challenges to healing and reconciliation because
these leaders are distancing themselves and their communities from the Prime Minister,
who together with the President, would lead healing and reconciliation efforts in the Rift
Valley and the country in general.
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)
77. The TJRC, which was appointed in July 2009, began its three-month setting up process.
Its roadmap shows that it will begin to receive submissions by January 2010. However, a
group of past victims have filed a case in the court against the Chair of the TJRC. Some
have argued they will not present themselves to the TJRC under the current Chair
because he served in the past regime. Nonetheless, civil society organisations have begun
to prepare victim groups and the public at large to make presentations to the TJRC. They
have produced ‘popular guides’ to questions of transitional justice and have been holding
workshops to discuss pertinent questions such as the TJRC mandate and the TJRC Act.
78. Despite widespread scepticism about the efficacy of commissions, 62 per cent of those
surveyed said they will appear before the TJRC, notably to find out the truth about what
happened. However, 27 per cent of IDPs are not sure whether or not they will participate
in the TJRC. This may be attributed to fear of reprisal or scepticism that the TJRC will
bring forth any new truths.45
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Interview with a displaced man in Eldoret, 8 October 2009
Interview with a politician in Bomet, 7 October 2009
44
Interview with a representative of IDP Network, 15 November 2009
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Interview with a Transitional Justice researcher in Nairobi, 8 December 2009
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Figure 7: Will you participate in the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)?

79. These responses are some evidence that there is support for TJRC and its work.
However, TJRC on its own will not deliver justice. Furthermore, this support is
dependent on what the people will see in terms of actions against impunity. If there is no
action taken and if the government obstructs interventions to punish politicians and
others who organised post-election violence, this support for TJRC will decline. People
will have little confidence in its ability to achieve its objective.
The National Cohesion and Integration Commission
80. The NCIC was appointed on 10 September 2009 and mandated to investigate complaints
lodged on ethnic or racial discrimination and refer the cases to the Attorney General. The
NCIC has begun its work, and has already summoned politicians found using hate
speech. If found guilty, the culprits face a five-year jail term or a fine of Ksh1 million.
81. The NCIC is not well known and members have complained about lack of funds to
undertake activities. A public information campaign is required to educate the people on
the role of this commission and its linkages with others commissions such as the TJRC.46
Summary and Conclusion
82. The government has closed all the main camps and started efforts to give land to landless
IDPs who showed initiative to acquire some of their own through self-help groups. The
arbitrary decision to purchase land for a limited number of IDPs has not only disrupted
the annual work plan of the Ministry of Special Programmes, but it has also increased the
vulnerability of IDPs who risk being thrown off land they bought on credit on the
assumption that they would pay for it on receiving the relief and reconstruction fund
from the government.
83. The handling of the land allocation to IDPs has revealed lack of inter-ministerial
coordination and accountability mechanisms, and politicised the resettlement
46

Interview with an NGO worker in Nakuru, 3 August 2009
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programme. The national IDP policy, due to be formulated by March 2010, should
designate a clear institutional framework to address the IDP question. Allegations of
corruption and discrimination in the allocation of land to IDPs should be investigated
and addressed.
84. The adoption and implementation of the National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict
Transformation should be expedited to consolidate and institutionalise the peacebuilding agenda. Actors in peace-building should also examine the reasons why
reconciliation efforts are not effective, particularly in areas affected by the post-election
violence.
85. The reluctance of Kenyan refugees to repatriate is an indicator that safe conditions in
return areas have not been restored. There is need for more peace-building efforts in
these areas and greater commitment to bring back the refugees. The continued presence
of displaced Kenyans – IDPs and refugees in Uganda – indicates that stability is yet to be
effectively secured in the areas affected by post-election violence.
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4 AGENDA ITEM 3: RESOLVING THE POLITICAL CRISIS (POWER
SHARING)
Introduction
86. Agenda Item 3 focused on ending the political crisis through power sharing. The KNDR
mediation specifically underlined the need to adjust the Constitution to provide for the
formation of a Coalition Government, an inclusive government comprising both parties,
PNU and ODM.
87. The mediation process did not conceive power-sharing as an end in itself but as a means
to achieving far-reaching reforms so as to adequately address the causes of the post election violence. Power-sharing sought to establish a framework for bi-partisan
consensus and cohesion in enacting policies and implementing reforms.
88. Previous reports have shown lack of cohesion within the government as a major
challenge to reforms. The reports identified absence of structured consultations between
the two parties, lack of internal cohesion, and general divisions between and among the
parties as the main challenges to the operation of the Grand Coalition Government.
Perceptions of a ‘two-governments-in-one’ have developed among Kenyans in tandem
with growing conflicts between the two parties in government.
89. This review examines how the parties are operationalising power-sharing and how they
are addressing the challenges of lack of cohesion. The review covers the period between
October and December 2009.
Key Findings
Summary of findings
•

Divisions within the parties continue to affect relations within the Grand
Coalition.

•

The two Principals work together but lack of structured consultations and
mechanisms for consensus deepen divisions within the government.

•

Mutiple divisions within government lead to lack of consensus on policy issues
and hinder service delivery.

•

Political factionalism continues to derail reforms.

•

Divisions within the main parties spill into the Grand Coalition Government.

Importance of cohesion in a Grand Coalition Government
90. Power sharing is usually recommended as a mechanism for promoting stability in deeply
fragmented societies and where it is difficult for a political party in government to govern
without the other. Grand coalitions are specifically established to enable governments –
during crisis – to unify all groups so that they can develop common positions in the
public interest. In this regard, Grand Coalitions are aimed at promoting and protecting
national interests -- individual party interests, though important, are subsumed by this
quest to promote the national interest.
91. Grand coalition governments usually require parties to compromise their positions in
order to create unity of purpose and focus on implementation of policies critical for the
stability of the country. Structured mechanisms for building consensus and general
consultations are established to ensure that relevant laws, policies and reforms in general
are implemented with bi-partisan support.
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92. The Coalition Government in Kenya continues to experience problems of lack of
cohesion. The government lacks effective mechanisms and structures for creating
cohesion and consensus. Divisions along ethnic and political lines continue to weaken
the government. Leaders rarely show unity of purpose. Political leaders are more
interested in their personal political interests – as individuals – rather than national
interests. Personal political interests and ethnic considerations have combined to reduce
the importance of national considerations. The national interest is increasingly losing
importance as politicians seek to mobilise ethnic groups to advance and protect their
individual interests. The discussion below focuses on the findings during this last quarter
of the year.
Cohesion within the Grand Coalition Government
93. The KNDR process called for power sharing and reform of State institutions to resolve
the political crisis. The absence of an opposition was expected to foster mutual trust and
goodwill among the coalition partners. This was critical for the enactment of laws. This
did not happen despite the signing and enactment of the Kenya National Accord and
Reconciliation Act. Rather than the National Accord being the basis for better relations
between the two parties, it has been the genesis of protracted conflicts and
disagreements. The parties have continued to disagree on its interpretation and, in
particular, the meaning of power sharing. Even if disagreements on this have not been in
the open in the past quarter, their effects continue to inform relations within the
coalition.
94. These differences between the parties within the Coalition have continued to foster an
impression of the coalition as a ‘two-governments-in-one.’ The partners continue to
present opposing viewpoints on important national issues. Factionalism within the
parties has added to this complex situation. The new alliances that have formed across
parties are also contributing to incoherence and making it difficult for the Grand
Coalition to build bi-partisan consensus on national issues. Thus, while in the past it was
easy to predict PNU or ODM’s line of thinking on any issue, it is no longer possible to do
so with certainty because of the fractious nature of the two parties and the new alliances
that have emerged to fragment the organisation of these two parties.
95. Previous reviews pointed out that since April 2009, the President and Prime Minister did
not show open disagreements. The Principals have continued to appear in key public
meetings together and have not openly disagreed on public policies. Public rating of their
relationship is also positive. Asked if they are satisfied with the working relationship
between the President and Prime Minister, over 57 per cent of Kenyans said they were
satisfied.
Figure 8: How satisfied or disatisfied are you with the working relationship between the
President and the Prime Minister?
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96. The unity and regular consultations between the President and the Prime Minister have
not translated into real cohesion within the government. More importantly, the old PNUODM rivalry has reduced in tandem with an increase in intra-party rivalries, which are
posing equally serious challenges to the Coalition Government. Neither have the
relations between the President and the Prime Minister resolved key conflicts within the
coalition. There are issues that the two are yet to resolve. The conflict over who should be
the Leader of Government Business in Parliament, for example, has not been resolved -yet the absence of the Leader of Government Business in Parliament was a major sticking
point.47 Suspicions and lack of trust within the Cabinet has spilled over to the civil service
with Permanent Secretaries. Rivalries between Ministers and Permanent Secretaries
have begun to develop where there is a perception that certain Permanent Secretaries
have been used to undermine ministers.48
97. Some of these problems are attributable to the failure of the two parties to consult, and
specifically on their failure to commit to a working framework. Critics argue that it is
debatable whether the two Principals support actions by each other, especially on
matters that require making decisions that would affect their respective political
constituencies. Political expediency has thus prevented consolidation of a sound working
relationship between the two Principals.
98. Lack of cohesion affects effectiveness of the coalition. When asked if the government
works well together, 69 per cent of respondents believe the government does not work
well together. This is a slight improvement from February 2009 when 77 per cent held
this view.

Table 7: Do you think the coalition government works well together?
Total

IDP

General

February

Work well

28%

24%

30%

21%

Do not work well together

69%

73%

68%

77%

Don’t know

3%

3%

2%

2%

99. A number of positive developments have taken place. The Office of the Prime Minister is
quite visible in regard to coordination of government affairs. Operationalisation of its
Strategic Plan is generally improving efficiency and effectiveness of the government. The
open and public conflicts with the Head of the Civil Service have also ended. However,
understaffing49 and weak institutional capacity have reduced the effectiveness of the
office. Without the necessary human capacity, it will be hard for the Office of the Prime
Minister to effectively carry out its mandate of coordinating and supervising ministries or
even enhance accountability within government.

Sharing of Public Sector Positions
100. The National Accord underlined that ‘the composition of the coalition government shall
at all times reflect the relative parliamentary strength of the respective parties and shall
Interview with an MP, 29 October 2009
Interview with an Assistant Minister, 11 November 2009
49 Interview with senior officer at the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional
Affairs, 18 November 2009
47

48
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at all times take into account the principle of portfolio balance.’50 This was to be done in
line with the principles that informed the establishment of the Coalition Government,
where the parties committed themselves to “work together in good faith as true partners,
through constant consultation and willingness to compromise …’51
101. Disagreements over how to share public sector positions continue to affect the running of
the Coalition Government. There are still tensions over how public sector appointments
are made. Those in ODM argue that the President does not consult with the Prime
Minister in making these appointments. Those in PNU argue that the Constitution still
empowers the President to make appointments without consulting the Prime Minister.
These two positions are evidence of lack of good will and commitment to the working of
the Grand Coalition. Principles of consultations, consensus building and undertaking to
compromise were the main building blocks when the government was formed. There is
need to continue respecting these principles so that the country can undertake key
reforms.
102. Because of these challenges, some Cabinet Ministers make appointments in parastatal
organisations that fall under their ministries without regard to procedure. Further, the
civil servants have been under pressure to control the interests of the politicians keen to
influence key decisions in the ministries52. Because of this, some senior civil servants and
heads of parastatals give employment opportunities to friends and allies of ministers.
This approach prevents a conflict with the ministers.
103. Unfortunately, this has several consequences for the ministries, government departments
and parastatals. It embeds a culture of patronage and weakens accountability. It makes it
difficult to investigate and punish corrupt practices.53 On the whole, the June 2009
circular by the Prime Minister giving guidelines on how Ministers and Boards of
Parastatals are to appoint heads of government institutions needs to be put into action in
order to stop patronage-based appointments.
Inter- and Intra-party Cohesion
104. Divisions have formed in all major political parties while alliances have formed across
the parties. For example, anti-reformers and others opposed to ICC intervention in
Kenya -- together with other measures to end impunity -- appear to be grouping to form
a solid group to obstruct the fight against impunity. How to counter the ICC intervention
and create strong alliances to win the 2012 election are factors contributing to these
dynamics. As noted in the previous reports, the President and the Prime Minister are not
the main players on matters concerning the ICC intervention. There are new principal
players representing variegated ethnic interests.
105. Within ODM, divisions over the government’s efforts to reclaim the Mau Forest –
depleted through illegal settlement -- and over whether or not to prosecute perpetrators
of the post-election violence threaten to fragment the party. Those opposed to the
evictions and the prosecutions form a faction within the party. The new alliances have
also emerged as leaders seek to protect and promote their individual interests and even
protect themselves from possible prosecution over the post-election violence. Leaders are
mobilising their communities to support their interests. In PNU, divisions are around
succession politics: the conflict is about the 2012 succession politics, with different
leaders competing for the party’s leadership.
106. In both parties, alternative and personalised bases of power have emerged. This has
See Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government signed on 28 February 2008.
“Agreement on the Principles of partnership of the coalition government” signed on 28 February
2009
52 Interview with an official, Ministry of Youth and Sports, 2 December 2009
53 Interview with an official, Teachers Service Commission, 7 December 2009
50
51
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intensified conflict within the parties. These conflicts have made it hard for political
parties to hold parliamentary group meetings. The meetings would have created an
avenue for consensus on important national matters.54
Political Parties Act
107. Factionalism points to failure to institutionalise political parties despite the enactment of
the Political Parties Act. Passed in 2007, the law provides a framework for the
registration, regulation and funding of political parties. Upon coming into force on 1 July
2008, the Act has had the immediate effect of reducing the number of registered political
parties from 167 to just 47. However, the registered parties have weak structures. This
number is expected to reduce further when parties start filing their annual returns
because many of them are unlikely to meet the operating criteria set out in the Act.55
108. The implementation of the Act has been slow for a number of reasons. First, the office of
the Registrar of Political Parties only started operating from September 2008, almost one
year after the law received presidential assent. Secondly, the registrar’s office still lacks
adequate human resource capacity to carry out its full mandate.56 Thirdly, the Political
Parties Disputes Tribunal has not yet started operating.
109. In order to curb patronage, the law compels the government to provide funds to parties.
But poor governance within parties and limited institutional capacity has made it
difficult for the parties to access government funding. The failure to effectively
operationalise the Act implies that parties will remain weak even as the country prepares
for the referendum and the forthcoming General Election. Further delays in
implementing the Political Parties Act will lead to the parties competing in 2012 with
weak institutional structures.
110. It is feared that as the 2012 elections draw nearer, it will be harder to implement the Act.
There is insufficient time to re-organise the political parties as envisioned in the Act. It is
possible that the country could go to the elections with ethnic political alliances rather
than institutionalised political parties. The Registrar of Political Parties and the Interim
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) need to consult urgently to speed up
implementation of the Political Parties Act before the main electoral processes begin.
Coherence in Decision Making
111. In most coalitions, the principle of collective responsibility demands that members of the
Cabinet either abide by collective decisions or resign. It is assumed that acceptance of a
ministerial position means accepting collective responsibility. Once the Cabinet makes a
decision, therefore, ministers are expected to support it, regardless of their personal
opinions. However, for the principle of collective responsibility to be adhered to, the
coalition partners have to regularly consult and discuss issues before they are presented
to the Cabinet. In addition, there needs to be coalition management policies and
procedures that are generally pre-agreed upon.
112. Some ministers do not abide by the principle of collective responsibility on important
national issues. The coalition has no disciplinary mechanisms to take action against
those who decline to do so. Furthermore, party leaders risk losing the ethnic support that
some of these ministers provide to their respective parties. Political expediency, rather
than prom0ting public good, appears to be shaping relations within the coalition.57 As
stated in past reports, lack of effective leadership and absence of a legal framework to
manage coalition affairs is responsible for this problem.

Interview with Turkana Central MP, 29 October 2009
Interview with a Senior Economist, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, 2 October 2009
56 ibid
57 Interview with an MP, October 2009
54
55
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113.

Establishing a conflict resolution mechanism and developing a framework to manage the
coalition are two outputs that are overdue. The two parties should introduce these
urgently and at the same time undertake to convene regular meetings of the Grand
Coalition Government.

114. Unfortunately, the main body that is meant to address these weaknesses, the Committee
on the Management of the Grand Coalition Affairs, has not been effective. It has had only
two meetings in the past eight months. The two parties must candidly debate the
relevance of this body at this point in time. The two parties should explore facilitation by
the KNDR technical team, comprising their representatives, instead of relying on the
Committee on the Management of the Grand Coalition Affairs.
Public Satisfaction with the Coalition Government
115. The public continues to voice frustration with slow delivery of services and reforms.
When asked what they disliked most about the coalition, 36 per cent of the respondents
noted the slow pace of reforms, 25 per cent corruption and 23 per cent the culture of
impunity.

Table 8: Please tell me the two things you dislike the most about the coalition
government
Total

IDP

General

Slow pace of reforms

36%

41%

34%

Corruption

25%

27%

25%

Culture of impunity
Political disputes
MPs’ refusal to pay taxes
None
Refused

23%
6%
5%
3%
1%

16%
7%
5%
2%
1%

25%
6%
5%
4%
0%

116. But people are happy about the Coalition Government in another important respect: the
government has led to the creation of peace – there is calm and people are not fighting.
More than half are happy about this. But some 32 per cent of IDPs have nothing to like
the Coalition Government about. This shows that the government’s failure to resettle
them has disillusioned many IDPs to a point where they like nothing about it.
Table 9: Please tell me the two things you like the most about the coalition
government

Total

IDP

General

Creation of peace
None
Others
Delivery of services

53%
17%
15%
8%

43%
32%
14%
3%

56%
13%
15%
10%

Creating employment
Don’t know

3%
1%

2%
5%

3%
0%

Enhancing rights and freedoms
Refused to answer

1%
1%

0%
2%

2%
0%
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117.

The citizens are also very dissatisfied with how the government is addressing the
problem of youth unemployment and regional inequalities. Asked whether or not they
were satisfied with the performance of the government in particular areas, about 77 per
cent said they were dissatisfied with efforts to address unemployment. Another 71 per
cent said they were not satisfied with efforts to address regional inequalities.

Table 10: Thinking about the coalition government, how satisfied or dissatisfied are
you with its performance in the following areas?

Satisfied

Dissatisfied

Don’t
know

Protecting the rights of the media

55%

42%

3%

Resettling IDPs
Giving IDPs financial support
Promoting reconciliation among groups in Kenya
Reducing tension between ethnic communities
Respecting human rights
Implementing constitutional reforms
Addressing regional inequalities in Kenya
Addressing youth unemployment

52%
52%
42%
39%
35%
34%
26%
21%

48%
47%
56%
60%
62%
60%
71%
77%

1%
1%
2%
1%
2%
5%
3%
1%

118. When asked whether or not they are satisfied with the performance of some important
people and institutions, the citizens in the areas affected by post-election violence are
very much satisfied with the media, religious institutions, Kofi Annan and development
partners.

Table 11: Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with the performance of some important
people & institutions in Kenya?

Press/Media
Religious leaders
Kofi Annan Team
Development partners/donors
Traditional leaders/elders
Committee
of
Experts
Constitutional Affairs
Prime Minister Odinga
President Kibaki
Parliament
Police

Satisfied Dissatisfied
88%
12%
82%
18%
81%
18%
80%
19%
72%
28%
on
59%
42%
58%
56%
46%
43%
37

41%
43%
53%
58%

Coalition Government
Courts

41%
38%

59%
61%

Political parties

37%

64%

119. These perceptions could be informed by the general slow pace of reforms to address
national problems. Despite this, 69 per cent of the respondents want the coalition
government to continue until 2012.
Figure 9: Do you prefer that the coalition government continues until 2012, or do you prefer
that the country holds elections before 2012?

Independent Review Commission on the General Election held in Kenya on 27
December 2007
120. The KNDR agreement required the two coalition parties to commit themselves to the
establishment of an independent review of the 2007 General Election. An Independent
Review Commission was established and completed its report in October 2008. In
implementing the report’s recommendations, the government set up the Interim
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) and an Interim Independent Boundaries
Review Commission (IIBRC) through the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act,
2008.
121. The Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) commissioners were sworn in on
11 May 2009 and tasked with reforming the electoral system and institutions.
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Draft IIEC Matrix Derived from the Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act, 2008
MANDATE
Reform electoral process
and the management of
elections in order to
institutionalise free and fair
elections

PROGRESS
The commission has published
two draft bills: The Electoral
Commission of Kenya Bill, 2009;
and The Elections Bill, 2009.

Establishment
efficient
and
secretariat

17 regional electoral Coordinators
and 210 Constituency elections
Coordinators
have
been
interviewed and recruited.

of
an
effective

REMARKS
The two bills are yet
presented to Parliament.

to be

If the draft constitution is passed, it
will overhaul the electoral process
At the end of December 2009, the
commission
announced
the
appointment of senior Secretariat
staff.

The Commission is to set up the
Secretariat by 15 January 2010.

Promotion of free and fair
elections

The Commission presided over
by-elections in Bomachoge and
Shinyalu constituencies.

Fresh registration of voters
and the creation of a new
voter register

The commission plans to roll out
the voter registration in January
2010 after the Secretariat is in
place.

Efficient
conduct
and
supervision of elections and
referenda

So far the Commission has
overseen two by-elections but it is
yet to oversee any referendum

Development of a modern
system
for
collection,
collation, transmission and
tallying of electoral data
Facilitation
of
the
observation,
monitoring
and evaluation of elections

The system is not in place; tenders
have been invited.

Settlement
of
minor
electoral disputes during an
election as may be provided
by law.
Promotion
of
voter
education and culture of
democracy.

When the Secretariat comes into
place it will oversee the efficient
running of the Commission.
Only few people were arrested for
election
offences;
ability
to
prosecute election offenders by the
Commission is critical
No voter register yet.
The country does not have a voter’s
register in place

The upcoming referendum on the
Constitution will be a test for the
commission; early preparation is
crucial
It is important to put the system in
place by the first quarter of 2010 or
before the referendum

The
Commission
has
only
facilitated
the
observation,
monitoring and evaluation of two
by-elections whereby 400 local
and international observers were
accredited to watch the polls.
The Bills are pending.

The two by-elections in Shinyalu
and Bomachoge were seen as a
success by local and international
observers.

The
IIEC
conducted
voter
education in Bomachoge and
Shinyalu
constituencies
by
identifying 42 local civil society
organisations that helped in the
exercise and to relate with people
at the grassroots.

Effective civic and voter education
can take place only when there is a
functional secretariat

39

The commission is yet to oversee
an election where disputes arose
and it facilitated its settlement.

122. It is notable that the draft electoral bills published, as well as the Harmonised Draft
Constitution, capture most of the envisaged electoral reforms. However, they are still in
draft form and it is not clear if they will become law. Further, the IIEC has recruited 17
regional electoral coordinators and 210 constituency elections coordinators but a full and
functional secretariat was not in place by end of December 2010. Although the
Commission announced the appointment of departmental heads, its choices were
assailed by criticism alleging political partiality. The commission sacked one of the newly
appointed managers because he had unsuccessfully run for election.
123. Considering that the referendum is to be held around the middle of 2010, voter
registration and the creation of a new voters register should have already started. With
the country preparing to hold a referendum on the new Constitution, any further delays
might not allow the IIEC to put in place the necessary infrastructure for an electronic
voter register.
124. To restore public confidence in voter registration, polling and tallying, IIEC should
ensure that a modern electronic system is used during the referendum. This will change
public attitudes and behaviour towards the election and hopefully rebuild confidence in
tallying.
The Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission
125. The Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC) was mandated to
provide recommendations on how to review the existing constituency and administrative
boundaries to reflect geographical size, ease of communication, community of interest,
population density and population trends.
Figure 10: IIBRC Roadmap
Jan 2011-Release of report
Presentation of final Report to Parliament
Oct.2010-Draft report released for public
debate
Feb-Mar 2010-Public hearings at provincial
levels
10 Feb 2010-Establishing the IIBRC secretariat
Jan 2010- Conducting civic education on boundaries review
13 Oct 2009 - IIBRC introduces their mandate countrywide.
Jun 09 - IIBRC starts operating
12 May 2009 - IIBRC Commissioners appointed by President
7 May 2009 - Parliament approves the IIBRC Commissioners' list
29 Apr 2009 - PSC names IIBRC chair &
Members
15 Apr 2009-PSC meets over selection procedure of IIBRC commissioners

•

Source: Interview with IIBRC, 20 November 2009

126. The IIBRC has faced several challenges that have slowed its work. Six months after the
Commission began operating, it is yet to set up a Secretariat to help it implement its
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mandate. In addition, adequate office space and funding took time to be secured.58 The
biggest challenge comes, however, from vested political interests in Parliament. While
the IIBRC is supposed to present a report to Parliament recommending demarcation of
boundaries, it is feared that the report might not be adopted if it does not capture the
interests of MPs.59
127. However, while the IIBRC is on schedule, its work overlaps with that of the constitutional
review. Although the Harmonised Draft Constitution spelt out how constituencies and
regional governments are going to be formed if a new Constitution is enacted, which was
the IIBRC’s remit, the revised version backs off this area. This emphasises the need for all
reform bodies to continually engage and consult. They should create synergy in their
activities.
Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)
128. The implementation of the CIPEV report, particularly the prosecution of post-election
violence suspects, has stalled, with Parliament failing to pass a motion to set up a Special
Tribunal for Kenya. This is despite the fact that many people are supportive of
prosecuting the perpetrators of the post-election violence to prevent a recurrence of
violence in the 2012 elections.
129. Implementation of the CIPEV report has been politicised and there are many personal,
political and even ethnic considerations surrounding the debate on prosecutions. These
interests have in turn made it hard for the government to establish a local tribunal to try
post-election violence suspects, with the ICC being left to pursue the matter. The ICC still
remains the preferred option for prosecuting post-election violence suspects mainly due
to the failure of the government to reform the entire judicial system.
130. In December 2009, the ICC Prosecutor visited Kenya to request the government to refer
the situation to The Hague. The two principals, while promising to cooperate with the
ICC, said they would institute reforms that would see suspects tried through local
mechanisms. Little movement is evident in this regard. The Prosecutor has asked the
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC for the go-ahead to take up the Kenya case.
131. Despite fear of ethnic violence breaking out if prosecutions take place, the survey
findings reveal that 57 per cent of respondents would support the trial of a senior
politician from their community. In addition, 49 per cent think members of their
community would support the same trial.

58
59

Interview with the Chairman, IIBRC, 20 November 2009
Ibid
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Figure 11: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election
violence, how will you personally react?

132. It is notable that only a few of the respondents said they would cause violence against
other communities in case a senior politician from their community is put on trial. The
high number of people supporting the trial of a senior politician from their community
could be due to the general perception that political elites are much more concerned with
their individual interests and political survival than justice for the victims when debating
prosecutions.
Summary and Conclusion
133. The Coalition Government continues to face several challenges, including lack of
cohesion and unity within the political parties. Multiple divisions within government and
the low-level of trust between key officials continue to undermine effectiveness of the
government and the reform initiatives in general. Furthermore, political party
factionalism has led to the creation of new personalised power bases and alliances. Some
of these alliances seek to promote and protect personal interests of senior politicians in
government. Their opposition to accountability for prosecution of perpetrators of postelection violence and impunity in general is very apparent.
134. Both sides of the coalition posit different challenges for reforms. Consultations between
the President and the Prime Minister have not translated into real cohesion within the
government. Because of this, it is doubtful that the two principals support each other in
ensuring implementation of matters agreed upon. Suspicions and mistrust characterise
relations between not only ministers but also between some Permanent Secretaries and
their ministers. In general, the government lacks cohesion and is incoherent at different
levels.
135. The personal political interests of individual leaders determined whether they would
support or oppose reforms. There is little or no consideration of national interests.
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Ethnic and personal interests supersede national interests on matters of reforms.
136. There are no effective mechanisms for resolving internal disputes within the coalition. In
addition, there is no structured mechanism for building consensus on important national
issues. The Committee for the Management of Grand Coalition Affairs has not been
effective in this respect. The parties should consider appointing the inter-parties
technical team that facilitated the KNDR mediation process to take on this role.

43

5

AGENDA ITEM 4: LONG-STANDING ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS

Introduction
137. Agenda Item 4 identified long-standing issues that had caused the crisis in Kenya. These
had to be addressed because they could lead to a more threatening crisis. These include:
• Undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional reforms;
• Undertaking land reforms;
• Tackling poverty, inequality, and addressing regional development imbalances;
• Tackling unemployment, particularly among the youth;
• Consolidating national cohesion and unity; and
• Addressing transparency, accountability and impunity.
138. Previous reports pointed out that progress had been made in respect of Agenda Item 4
but the pace was generally slow and not sufficient to satisfy public expectations.
Processes have begun but these are yet to be institutionalised. Even though envisaged
reforms are being undertaken, the public’s perception of the government’s unwillingness
or inability to undertake far-reaching reforms still persists because of failure to act on
those reforms that require hard decisions. Prosecution of perpetrators of post-election
violence and punishing those involved in corruption are examples in this regard.
139. This section of the report discusses progress made in undertaking reforms under Agenda
Item 4 during the period between October and December, 2009. The Constitution is
given more attention relative to others partly because of its significance in generating the
required momentum for overall reforms, and partly because the review is timed to end in
early 2010.
Key Findings
Summary of findings
•

•

Constitutional, institutional and legal reforms.
o Harmonised Draft Constitution of Kenya presented to the public
o Final Report on the Taskforce on Police Reform presented to the
President.
o Parliament approved names of nine Members of the Interim Independent
Constitutional Dispute Resolution Court.
Parliament approved the National Land Policy.
o The eviction of illegal squatters from Mau Forest began in an attempt to
rehabilitate the water catchment area.

•

Funding for Kazi Kwa Vijana and administration of the Youth Enterprise
Development Fund faced difficulties.

•

National Cohesion and Integration Commission begins its work.

•

TJRC becomes operational amid a number of challenges.

Constitutional and Institutional Reforms
140. The KNDR agreement on Agenda Item 4 had proposed the constitutional review process
to begin around August 2008 after enactment of the relevant laws.60 Parliament passed
the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill, 2008, and the Constitutional Review Bill in
December 2008. Both received presidential assent the same month. The initial proposal
would have had the Committee of Experts present the Harmonised Draft Constitution to
60

The Constitution Review agreement signed in March anticipated the review process to begin by May
2008.
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the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) by May 2009 for discussion. A referendum
would have been conducted by the end of August 2009 and a new Constitution
promulgated in September 2009. However, it was not until 23 February 2009 that the
government gazetted the Committee of Experts. The CoE began work in March 2009.
141. The Constitution of Kenya Review Act (2008) requires the CoE to prepare a Harmonised
Draft of the Constitution61 and a report on the merits and demerits of the various
positions. The law required the CoE to give the draft to the public for debate for 30 days.
This the CoE did on 17 November 2009.
142. In coming up with the Draft, the Committee consulted several documents as required by
law. The Committee also consulted reports by various Commissions established through
the KNDR process. In addition, the Committee consulted with other experts and
stakeholders, including the Reference Group. The CoE supplemented these with public
regional hearings as well as holding thematic consultations with caucuses and interest
groups.62
143. One challenge experienced in these consultations was that even those individuals that the
Reference Group represented constantly questioned the latter’s legitimacy and
credibility. The Reference Group was faulted for being Nairobi-based and elitist in
nature,63 and not representative64. Within the church and the civil society in general,
there was no coherence in articulating concerns. This incoherence within important
sectors made it difficult to provide a common position to the CoE.
144. There are also those who preferred the Committee to consult widely and to include
everything people said.65 There are others who believed that consultations needed to be
restricted to the Reference Group. Whatever the position, consultations had a “sunset
clause” and the review process itself has certain important timelines.66 How to address
these concerns about effective consultation caused significant delays in the process as a
whole.
Delays in publishing the Draft Constitution
145. The CoE came up with a new roadmap, which envisaged completion of the review by the
first quarter of 2010. The roadmap devoted September 2009 to engagement with the
public. The Parliamentary Select Committee would receive the draft during the period
and discuss it in November 2009. A referendum was expected around March 2010.
146. Going by these timelines, the review process is behind schedule by about three months.
The CoE did not produce a draft in September; the draft was published in November
2009. Going by the timelines for the remaining work, and assuming that the remaining
constitutional review work will be completed without disagreements or further delay, the
earliest a new Constitution can be in place is mid-2010 rather than March 2010.
147. It is possible that there will be more delays because politicians are yet to effectively
review the document and make comments. The PSC and Parliament are due to begin
their discussions. Disagreements and lack of consensus at any of these two levels could
lead to further delays. Experience has shown that it is at this level of the PSC and
Parliament that the review is held hostage to vested interests. These are the main hurdles
on the way but the review process cannot avoid them. For this reason, the leadership of
both the PSC and Parliament will be required to be pragmatic. They should provide clear
direction to prevent the review process from stalling. Fortunately, there are clear
61 Section 32 of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (2008)
62 The COE Report
63 Interview with an official of KHRC on 29 October 2009
64 Some representatives from the civil society in a forum held on 22 October 2009 did not want to be
bound by what the civil society Reference Group had agreed or discussed with the CoE.
65 Interview with a senior officer of the KHRC on 29 October 2009
66 ibid
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timelines that will dictate how long both the PSC and Parliament will take in discussing
the document. The leadership of both the PSC and Parliament guide the process bearing
these timelines in mind.
The CoE term and mandate beyond March 2010
148. The CoE was expected to complete its work by the end of March 2010, one year after they
came into office. However, by March 2010, the CoE will not have completed the
envisaged tasks. This new roadmap shows that the review process contains activities that
the CoE will implement beyond March 2010 when their term ends. For instance, the CoE
will not have undertaken civic education in preparation for the referendum. This
suggests a need to extend the CoE’s term of office early to avoid delays in undertaking
activities critical for the referendum.
*The upper part represents the new roadmap, which shows that the constitutional review might
go on beyond the 12-month period provided for by the Constitution of Kenya Review Act. The
lower one represents the original roadmap provided by the CoE
Road Map on the Constitutional Review

25Jun

27Mar

26Apr
30Jan

27Jun
31Mar

New
Constitution
to come into
11- 16effect within
Jul Apr 14 days.
Results of the
referendum to be
2- announced within
April 2 days.
Referendum to be held
within 30 days.

CoE to conduct Civic Education for
the first 30 days.
AG to publish the Draft Constitution
within 30 days.

25Feb

9Aug

17Nov
9Aug

17Dec
8Sep

31The National Assembly to Approve the draft
Dec
within 30 days.
PSC to receive the harmonised draft from the COE and
1submit final draft to the National Assembly within 7
Dec days.
PSC submit the draft to the CoE to integrate
Their agreed views for 21 days.

28jan

18Feb
10Nov

7jan

20Oct

Committee to present the draft to PSC for debate and
agreement for 21 days.

29Sep

Committee to consider views of the Public and integrate
the views into the draft for 21 days.

Committee to publish its Report for 30 days public debate.

Consultation with Reference Groups.

Thematic Consultations on Contentious Issues
Identification of Contentious Issues and Issues agreed upon
2-mar

2Mar

Research, Studies, Public view and consultations
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149. Despite these delays, Kenyans are optimistic that they will have a new Constitution.
Asked whether they thought that it was likely that the Coalition Government will make a
new Constitution by the end of March 2010, 55 per cent of the respondents said it was
likely. IDPs, however, are less optimistic. Past failures in the review process and the
violence associated with electoral politics have perhaps disillusioned them.
Figure 12: Do you think it is likely that the coalition government will make a new constitution
by the end of March 2010?

150. Many people will also turn up to vote in the referendum. More than 80 per cent said that
they will to vote in the referendum and would also vote in the next General Election.
Figure 13: If a referendum were held next year, would you turn out to vote?

151. Interestingly, about 44 per cent of the respondents do not think that the new

47

Constitution will be satisfactory in addressing the needs of most Kenyans. The desire,
optimism and enthusiasm for the new Constitution among Kenyans are so high that even
if the current draft were to be rejected, only 11 per cent of Kenyans would want the
process forgotten or abandoned altogether.

Figure 14: Do you think this new constitution will be satisfactory or unsatisfactory in
addressing the needs of most Kenyans?

152. The politics of succession and the presidential election in 2012 in particular remain a
significant challenge for the review process. Political realignments in preparation for the
2012 General Election and a host of other vested interests that perceive the new
Constitution as a threat to them could stall the review process if leaders fail to resolve
their differences. Already, disagreements over boundaries spilled into the review process,
with some leaders demanding new constituencies before a new Constitution is put in
place.
153. The main hurdles to the review process are political. They appear in the form of lack of
consensus between the ODM and PNU. Lack of cohesion – discussed above – has
widened their differences over the review process. Suspicions and mistrust continue to
characterise their relations and are certainly impacting on how they approach the review
process. Both parties have not agreed on the system of government: they have presented
opposing viewpoints on this matter. In the absence of structured mechanisms for
engagement within the coalition, it is difficult for the parties to agree on a common
position.
154. Some positive developments have taken place. Both parties have been consulting on the
draft. This consultation should be sustained. Should the parties not reach agreement
before the draft is prepared for the referendum, a mediator should intervene to assist the
parties agree on contentious issues. This is important because divisions in the
referendum could lead to a violent 2012 election.
155. In the meantime, on 24 November 2009, Parliament approved the names of nine Interim
Independent Constitutional Dispute Resolution Court (IICDRC) nominees (six Kenyans
and three foreigners) to help in the speedy settlement of constitutional review disputes.
But the members were yet to take oath of office by the time of writing this review. It is
important for the court to be set up with speed and for it to begin preparing for any
disputes arising from the review. So far, cases are being filed in the high Court.
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Judicial Reforms
156. The Taskforce on Judicial Reforms presented its report to the government on 10 August
2009, but its recommendations are yet to be implemented. The Cabinet sub-Committee
urged the Taskforce to take into consideration recommendations by the Committee of
Experts on the Constitution.67 However, the Judiciary has been undertaking
administrative reforms such as establishing an information technology system. On the
whole, the main window of opportunity for judicial reforms is the Harmonized Draft
Constitution because it proposed comprehensive institutional and policy changes for the
Judiciary.
157. A point to stress is that reforms in the judiciary are long overdue. It is critical that the
government implements actions that can restore public confidence in the Judiciary even
as the country awaits a new Constitution. Enactment of the Judicial Service Commission
Bill is still pending and the government is yet to develop a policy to streamline the
functioning of legal and judicial institutions.
158. There is a growing conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary over the reform
agenda. Initially, the conflict revolved around performance contracting, which the
Judiciary refused to commit to. The conflict has extended to the Judiciary’s refusal to
adhere to the Treasury’s policy to withdraw luxurious cars. At the centre of this conflict is
the question of independence of the Judiciary and the autonomy it should enjoy in
executing its work. These are important issues that require to be addressed through
comprehensive institutional and policy reform rather than through administrative
procedures. Unless there are significant institutional and policy changes, the conflict will
remain.
Police Reforms
159. The Taskforce on Police Reforms presented its final report to the President and the
Prime Minister in early November 2009. An implementation committee was also set up
in December 2009. The report proposed far-reaching policy and institutional reforms
within the police service. It proposes, inter alia, creation of institutions to address the
conduct of the police so as to restore public confidence in the police, a National Policing
Council, and development of a strict Code of Ethics. The Ministry of Internal Security
and Provincial Administration is working on implementing these recommendations.
However, only administrative reforms are being undertaken.68 But security sector
reforms are required urgently if the government is to address insecurity. Implementing
police reforms as proposed in the taskforce report should take place without delay. As
noted in previous reports, institutional reform should be far-reaching. Transfer of
individuals without implementing policy changes will not transform the police force.
160. The failure to institute real reforms in the police force continues to reflect badly on it.
The survey shows that public perception about the police force is overwhelmingly
negative. Asked whether the police have done an excellent, good, just fair or poor job
protecting the rights of Kenyans within the last three months, over 66 per cent rated the
police performance as either “just fair” or “poor”. Only 34 per cent rated them as either
excellent or good. Indeed, over 72 per cent of IDPs think the police are doing a poor job.

67 Interview with a senior finance officer at the Judiciary, 18 November 2009.
68 Interview with senior government official, (see also Daily Nation, 2 December 2009: 9)
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Figure 15: Have the police done an excellent, good, just fair, or poor job protecting the rights
of Kenyans within the last three months?

161. The absence of security sector reforms has serious implications for the country — the
security organs are poorly prepared to deal with any serious or widespread violence if it
were to occur. There is need for urgent security sector reforms even before a new
Constitution is put in place. As noted in previous reports, the mere transfer of individuals
is not sufficient; it should be matched with broad policy and institutional reforms.
Land Reforms
162. Parliament passed the National Land Policy on 2 December 2009, without changes. This
policy had been presented to Parliament as Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on 1 December
200969 for parliamentary debate. There was broad consensus to pass the Draft Land
Policy70. Already, the necessary laws are being drafted with the help of the Law Reform
Commission.
163. Other (administrative) reforms in the Ministry of Lands are on course. The first phase of
the Land Rent Data migration began in October 2009 in the preparation for the full
computerisation of the ministry’s record and the launch of the Integrated Lands Rent
Billing System (ILRBS) in 201071. The process is, however, faced with a number of
challenges, most important being the authentication of documents and shortage of
manpower.72 Furthermore, some of the documents had already been tampered with, thus
making the process more hectic. 73
164. The official relocation of settlers from the South Western Mau Forest began in
November. Centres have been established where people can surrender their title deeds in
the 14 districts surrounding the Mau Complex. This move is aimed at encouraging those
with title deeds to voluntarily surrender land they acquired in the complex as discussions
on compensation continue74.
165. The Mau Forest interim coordinating secretariat has also released a five-phase work plan
for the rehabilitation of the Mau. Preparations for repossession of the forest were under
way and the second phase was scheduled to end in December 2009. The third phase
would begin in January 2010.75 The evictions have, however, produced a new wave of
69 see http:/www.ardhi.go.ke Published Tuesday 1 December 2009
70 see http:/www.ardhi.go.ke Published Wednesday 14 October 2009
71 Presentation by the Minister for Lands, James Orengo, at the land reforms non-state actors’ breakfast
meeting on the National Land Policy held at Intercontinental Hotel, 7 October 2009
72 Ibid.
73 see http:/www.ardhi.go.ke Published Thursday, 29 October 2009
74 See http://www.kws.go.ke/kws/info, Published 28 October 2009
75 See http://www.kws.go.ke/kws/info, Published 28 October 2009
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IDPs, and new political conflicts within ODM.
166. The Mau Forest conservation efforts and the conflicts around them are an example of the
challenges facing the Grand Coalition Government when the parties are required to make
hard decisions. The evictions are the result of recommendations by a taskforce appointed
to study how the forest can be conserved. Political expediency appears to prevent full
implementation of these and other recommendations pertaining to irregular allocation of
land. In addition to Mau, the Ndungu Report on illegal allocations of public land has not
been implemented.
Poverty, Inequality and Regional Imbalances
167. The last report pointed out that the government was in the process of reforming the
management of the Constituency Development Fund. The new Public Procurement and
Disposal (Amendment) Regulation Act, 2009, effected new changes to the CDF
structures. District Development Officers in CDF committees were stripped of their
secretarial powers in CDF tender committees. Instead, these powers were handed over to
District Procurement Officers. Local contractors in the respective constituencies were
also given exclusive preference in CDF procurements. External contractors would only be
considered when it had been established that there was no local capacity. The provincial
administration was also removed from the membership of two CDF tender committees.
168. The interim report of the Taskforce on Development of a Comprehensive Well Targeted
Food Subsidy Scheme for Kenya was presented to the Prime Minister. The team set up a
food subsidy scheme aimed at cushioning the poor from increasing food prices and
famine. The programme, termed Saidia Jamii, will be piloted to test how the full project
can be rolled out in July 2010. Under the pilot, the government will disburse 600 million
to a group of vulnerable people in slums.
169. As part of realising Vision 2030, the Public Service Commission has issued guidelines for
district focused recruitment to ensure regional equity and fairness in recruitment into the
public sector.76 The PSC is also addressing gender imbalances in the civil service to
ensure that at least 30 per cent of public servants are women77.
Unemployment Particularly among the Youth
170. Unemployment, especially among the youth, still remains the number one problem for
young people in Kenya. In fact, the survey findings show that unemployment is
considered a bigger problem than insecurity, acts of violence and drug abuse combined.

76
77

Public Service Week forum, presentation by the Public Service Commission secretary Bernadette Nzioki
on the role of recruitment and selection in realisation of Vision 2030, 15 October 2009.
Public Service Week forum, presentation by the Public Service Commission secretary Bernadette Nzioki
on the role of recruitment and selection in realisation of Vision 2030, 15 October 2009.
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Table 12: What are the two main issues that the youth in this area complain about?
Total

IDP

General

Unemployment

48%

49%

48%

Poverty

20%

20%

20%

Education

11%

14%

10%

Poor pay

7%

4%

7%

Drug abuse

6%

4%

6%

Insecurity

4%

6%

4%

Acts of violence

1%

0%

1%

171. Past progress reports pointed at allegations of misappropriation of Kazi Kwa Vijana
funds and subsequent conflicts between the Office of the Prime Minister and the
Treasury. The reports also noted that out of Ksh10 billion meant for the programme, only
Ksh3.4 billion had been released. This failure to release funds and the blame game
between the PM’s office and Treasury disenchanted the youth in many areas. The fund is
also faced with numerous allegations of corruption involving the provincial
administration staff and the workers, where “workers accept to be paid half their daily
allowance for work not done”.78
172. The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) had its problems, too. After over two
months of a standoff between the board of directors and the minister over the dismissal
and later reinstatement of the Fund’s CEO, the board members resigned in November
2009.79 The conflict between the Board and the minister brought to the fore the eternal
problem of poor coordination in implementing programmes.
Consolidating National Cohesion and Unity
173. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission finally began its work. However, the
commission faces some challenges including inadequate funds80 and, as noted earlier, it
lacks a public profile – it is not well known. The government has also established a
Department of National Cohesion within the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and
Constitutional Affairs. TJRC has also begun its operations.81 A National Elders
Conference is planned to take place early in 2010. These initiatives have mandates that
look similar. They should synergise each other and be cautious in interpretation of their
mandates and in operationalisation of their responsibilities so as to avoid conflict.
Failure to speak to one another and synergise their activities will eventually create
tension and conflicts in their relationship.
Transparency, Accountability and Impunity
174. The Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) reforms five-year programme is
coming to an end and is in the process of evaluating its programmes.82 The programme
78 Ibid.
79 See http://www.gender.go.ke/ Also, The Standard on Sunday, 1 November 2009. Women enterprise
fund disbursement status report as at 31 October 2009. pg 13.
80 Interview with a Commissioner, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, on 25 October 2009
81 Interview with an official, Department of National Cohesion, MOJCA, 11 November 2009.
82 Rapporteur’s report of The Governance, Justice Law and order Sector (GJLOS) reform programme Review and reflection retreat held on 29 and 30 September 2009.
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has experienced a number of challenges: lack of a clear definition of reforms; weak
linkages with non-state actors; weak linkage with other public sector reform
programmes; threat of reform fatigue and vulnerability as a result of the impending
transition.83
175. The Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 launched the Second
African Peer Review Mechanism’s country review mission preparatory activities on 22
October 2009. This mission will provide Kenya with an opportunity for a comprehensive
self-assessment, which will focus more on democracy and political governance. This will
in turn enable Kenyans to assess the status of the country and the challenges it is facing.
Unfortunately, the visit of the review mission, scheduled to have begun in October, has
been rescheduled several times. There is need to fast-track the mission because it is a
legitimate AU endeavour.
176. Progress on issues of impunity and in particular progress in addressing issues around
grand corruption has been minimal. As discussed above, the government has failed to
establish a Special Tribunal to try perpetrators of post-election violence. The government
has also not made progress in addressing cases of corruption. Indeed new cases of
corruption continue to be reported even when no major action is taken on previous ones.
But it should be appreciated that in December 2009 the President directed the
government to begin prosecuting corrupt public servants. In the last quarter, Permanent
Secretaries were reported to be planning to meet to effect this directive.84
Summary and Conclusion
177. The Committee of Experts has already published a new draft constitution. The draft has
been subjected to public debate and is due to be revised for presentation to the PSC.
However, divisions within the Grand Coalition Government and increased political
factionalism make it difficult for the parties to develop consensus on a number of
contentious issues. This may delay the finalisation of the draft constitution. Furthermore,
the schedule for a new constitution is behind by about three months and a new roadmap
for the remaining aspects of the constitutional review indicates that it will be completed
in mid-2010. The mandate of the CoE will end in March 2010, or 12 months after the
date they were sworn in. There is need, thus, to extend the CoE time period beyond
March 2010.
178. As mentioned in the previous report, the review process can fail on account of failure to
carefully negotiate the vested interests around a Constitution. Political actors have
different preferences, which cannot be resolved through public debates. The parties are
yet to develop consensus on how to move forward. The differences between the parties
are clearly likely to delay the process. As mentioned previously, if differences persist, a
mediator would be required to assist the parties to develop a common position before the
referendum.
179. Institutional reforms in the rest of Agenda Item 4 have begun but the focus is on
administrative aspects. The government must focus attention on broad policy and
institutional changes because reforms are not about transferring individuals from one
station to another. The proposals in the Harmonised Draft Constitution present an
important opportunity to regenerate the reform momentum.

83 Ibid
84

Interview senior government official
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
180.

The report has highlighted a number of conclusions in the various sections
corresponding to the KNDR agreement. This section reiterates some of these issues in
order to emphasise their importance.

181.

The findings for this quarter, October to December 2009, once again show that
security is an issue of concern in several parts of the country. The police have not been
effective in disarming illegally armed groups. The groups are emboldened by these
failures. The findings also show that the government has failed to establish a Special
Tribunal to try perpetrators of the post-election violence. The failure and the general
inability of the Cabinet and Parliament to establish the tribunal points to concerted
and unified efforts by senior politicians to defeat justice and to undermine the process
of instituting accountability. Nevertheless, Kenyans generally support the prosecution
of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the post-election violence.

182.

The public supports the ICC intervention in Kenya. People are concerned that if the
government conducts the trials, there will be no accountability. The interest of ICC in
the Kenyan situation has, however, triggered new dynamics in Kenya’s politics. New
political alliances have begun to form. These alliances, coming at a time of discussions
of ICC intervention, have the potential to undermine efforts to bring the perpetrators
of violence to account.

183.

International and local pressure on the government to end impunity for the postelection violence has triggered renewed threats and intimidation of potential
witnesses, human rights defenders, victims and survivors of the post-election violence.
Murder cases also have been cited. Setting up a functional and independent witness
protection programme under the watch of the international community and human
rights defenders is now an imperative.

184.

The problems affecting IDPs are far from over. Unfortunately, allegations of corrupt
practices in the resettlement programme, which previous reports have repeatedly
mentioned, have continued to deepen. Poor coordination between various ministries
and departments involved in resettlement has undermined the programme. IDPs thus
remain an eye sore. Politicians are interested in the IDP issue only when it is of
political value.

185.

Finally, the lack of coherence and cohesion in the Grand Coalition remains an
unresolved major sticking point for reform. Political factionalism within the individual
parties has compounded these problems and given rise to new ethnic alliances whose
main motive is to promote and protect the interests of politicians and block reforms
that are critical for ending impunity. This has resulted in individual interests
subjugating national interests. To promote these interests, politicians are increasingly
turning to their ethnic constituencies and other parochial considerations. This has had
the effect of undermining national political values. Consultations and regular meetings
between the two principals have not translated into cohesion within the government.
Their allies with vested interests tend to undermine what they have agreed upon
especially if such decisions would undermine individual interests of politicians
supporting them.

186.

The new political dynamics are clearly a danger to reforms that the country has been
trying to undertake. These individual interests and the new alliances have deflected
attention from reforms. As a result, the small window that has remained open risks
closing prematurely. The constitutional review process, however, has created new hope
and probably will create a solid space for Kenyans to begin rebuilding institutions.

187.

The review process, therefore, must be protected from these parochial interests. To
prevent the process from stalling, the
parties must consider establishing an
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elaborate mediation mechanism; a mediator would be required to assist the parties
develop a common position to speed up the process. And given the inability of the
Committee for the Management of the Grand Coalition Affairs to meet regularly and
resolve the problems facing the coalition, it is important to consider passing this
mandate to the KNDR technical team that comprised staff from both parties.
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